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How the economy reacts to a major change in the policy regime is an
issue of widespread disagreement.At one extreme, some economists (e.g.,
Thomas Sargent, 1982, 1983) suggest that if a change in regime is
sufficiently credible, the economy will move quickly to the new rational
expectations equilibrium. Yet others (e.g., John Taylor, 1975; Benjamin
Friedman, 1979; Christopher Sims, 1982) argue that instant credibility is
unlikely and that rational individuals should typically be expected to learn
gradually about the new stochastic environment. This disagreement over how
quickly economic agents perceive a change in their environment naturally
leads to disagreement over the short-run impact of policy changes.
This paper is a case study of one particular change in regime--the
introduction of the Federal Reserve System at the end of 1914. We use data
on the term structure of interest rates to estimate how quickly individuals
came to understand the new stochastic environment in which they were
operating. Since long—term interest rates in part reflect expectations of
future short-term interest rates, term structure data allow us to infer how
expectations adapted to this change in regime.—2—
In Section I we provide a brief historical overview of the introduction
of the Federal Reserve System. Our emphasis in particular is on the
prevailing view of the impact of the Fed prior to its beginning of
operations. Such historical evidence is by its nature difficult to
interpret and highly controvertible. Our reading of the historical record,
however, is that observers during 1914 expected the Fed to effect a major
change in the economic forces determining interest rates.
We document in Section II that a substantial change in the stochastic
process of short-term interest rates did indeed occur. In the period from
1890 to 1910, short rates were quickly mean—reverting and highly seasonal.
By contrast, in the period from 1920 to 1933, short rates were much more
persistent; indeed, they were close to a random walk. There is little doubt
that there was a major change in the stochastic process generating interest
rates.
In Section III we examine the relation between long-term (six-month)
and short—term (three-month) interest rates. Since the long rate
incorporates an expectation of a future short rate, a change in the
stochastic process generating short rates should alter the relation between
long and short rates. In other words, as Robert Lucas's (1976) critique
suggests, the parameters of traditional term structure equations relating
long rates to short rates (e.g., Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch, 1966)
should not remain invariant across regimes. In particular, since shocks to
the short rate were less persistent in the 1890—1910 period than in the
1920-1933 period, the long rate should be less responsive to the short rate—3—
in the earlier period. We find that the relation between six-month and
three-month rates did in fact change in the way suggested by
expectations-based theories of the term structure.
We examine in Section IV the timing of the change in regime. Using
switching-regression techniques, we estimate that the most likely date for
the change in the stochastic process of the short rate is between December
1914 and March 1915. This estimate, which uses only interest rate data,
coincides almost exactly with the date at which the Federal Reservebegan
operation. We consider the possibility that the change in regime was
gradual, but find instead that it occurred essentially all at once.
In Section V we study how quickly financial market participants
perceived the change in regime. Our inferences are based on the premise
that long-term interest rates depend on individuals' perception of the
stochastic process the short rate is following. If there was a substantial
lag in individuals' recognition of the change in their environment, then the
relation between long rates and short rates should have changed long after
the change in regime itself took place. By contrast, we find that the
change in the relation between the six-month rate and the three-month rate
roughly coincided with the change in regime. This finding suggests that
financial market participants quickly understood the stochasticprocesses
generated by the new policy regime and that, at least for this historical
episode, the convergence to the new rational expectations equilibrium was
quite rapid.
We conclude in Section VI. The evidence from the founding of the Fedsuggests that a major change in a policy regime, backed with the
establishment of new and powerful institutions, can be understood very
quickly by financial market participants. It would of course be imprudent
to extrapolate directly this single historical episode to the evaluation of
other sorts of policy proposals. This episode does illustrate, however, the
potential for rapid adjustment of agents' expectations in the face of
substantial and widely believed changes in the continuing policy rule.
I. Historical Overview
The year 1914 witnessed two crucial events in the world of finance:1
the creation of an important new institution, the Federal Reserve System,
and the elimination of an old one, the classical Gold Standard.2 In the
sections that follow, we provide econometric evidence that there was a
substantial change in regime and that this change was understood by
financial market participants at the time. Our goal in this section is
to show that such a conclusion is historically plausible; indeed, it is
suggested by the literature of the time. After describing briefly the
events surrounding the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and the opening of
the Reserve Banks, we show that the relevant economic actors were aware that
a regime change was taking place and had a rough idea of how the new regime
would differ from the old.
The proximate cause of the founding of the Fed was the financial panic
of 1907, which severely disrupted the economy and was widely blamed for
the 1907—1908 recession. In 1908, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland
Act, the most important result of which was creation of the National-5—
Monetary Commission. This group of legislators, academics, and bankers
published a report in 1910 that discussed in enormous detail the positive
and negative features of the United States' and foreign finanical systems;
the report served as a major impetus to the founding of the Fed. The
Federal Reserve Act passed into law on December 23, 1913. The presidents
of the banks met for the first time in July of 1914 and discussed the
organization the system would take; the banks officially opened for business
on November 16, 1914.
It is hard to believe that any change of regime was more widely
perceived than the founding of the Federal Reserve.Paul Warburg, a
well-known investment banker and advocate of the creation of the Fed,
specifically applied the metaphor of a change in political regime, calling
the Fed's founding "the Fourth of July in the economic life of our nation."3
The New York Times for November 16, 1914 editorialized that "the starting of
the Federal Reserve system, although incompletely, opens a new era in which
'old statistics do not count.'"4 We could not hope for a more precise
description of how an economic actor should respond to structural change.
The precise manner in which the Fed would operate was of course not
known by financial market participants. The discussion in the report
of the National Monetary Commission, however, makes clear that at least one
essential function of the Fed was to operate a discount mechanism that
would provide credit in times of excess demand, thereby dampening interest
rate fluctuations and decreasing the frequency of bank failures. The day
before the opening of the Fed, Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo
announced:—6—
The opening of these banks marks a new era in the history of business
and finance in this country. It is believed that they will put an
end to the annual anxiety from which the country has suffered
for the last generation about insufficient money and credit to move
the crops each year, and will give such stability to the banking
business that extreme fluctuations in interest rates and available
credits which have characterized banking in the past will be
destroyed permanently. 5
The financial press also believed that the introduction of the Fed would
initiate an "elastic" currency and credit system.6 No longer would interest
rates have to move over such a great range to match the supply and demand
nr
Theevidence -indicates strongly that financial market participants
understood the intentions of the new institution. What we are unable to
extract from the histor-ical record is whether businessmen at the time of the
Fed's founding expected it to accomplish its assigned tasks, or
alternatively, how long they expected the Fed would take to reach full
operation. We can determine, however, that within a year of the opening of
the Fed, popular opinion was that, as far as stabilization of the credit
market was concerned, the Fed had accomplished all that it had set out to
do. "What has thus far been done has been effectual in rendering stable and
more uniform rates of discount prevalent throughout the country," wrote
"Washington Notes" in the Journal of Political Economy.7 On the subject of
whether the Fed was wholly responsible for the year of ease in the credit
markets that had followed its founding, The Times wrote:
Few will contend that the favorable progress of the year is altogether
due to the betterment of the conditions of banking and of commercial
credit through the operation of the Reserve system. Fewer still will
contend that the system did not reenforce the forces making for recovery
in ways that hardly anybody foresaw. No doubt the extremely easy money
market assisted, but the money market would hardly have been so easy—7—
without the certainty that there would be no currency-scarcity under the
Federal system.8
II. The Stochastic Process of the Short Rate
The historical evidence presented above suggests that the behavior of
short—term interest rates was a key feature of the change in regime
associated with the founding of the Federal Reserve System. It is therefore
natural to focus on this variable when studying the transition from the old
regime to the new one.9 The interest rate series that we examine here is the
three—month time loan rate available at New York City banks for the first
week of each month during the period from 1890 to 1933.10 New York was
already the major financial center of the country at this time. As John
James (1978, pp. 61-64) reports, most loans in bank portfolios were
short-term and most loans in New York were fixed maturity. We are thus
examining here the rates on an important form of short-term commercial
credit. Since there was no significant Treasury bill market until the early
1930s, it is one of the principal short—term rates in the economy.
Table 1 shows the autocorrelations of the short rate during two
different sample periods.11 The first ends clearly before the changes that
led to the new regime, while the second begins several years after the
changes had occurred (as well as after the end of World War I). We present
the autocorrelations for both the level of the rate and its first difference.
The standard deviation of the short rate, both in levels and first
differences, is provided at the bottom of the table.—8—
For the 1891-1910 period, the first autocorrelation of the level of the
short rate is 0.75, and the autocorrelations die out fairly quickly. Seven
out of the first eight autocorrelations of the change in the short rate are
negative, indicating that the short rate was at least partly mean—reverting.
For the 1921-1933 period, the first autocorrelation of the level is close to
one and the autocorrelations die out very slowly. All the autocorrelations
of the change in the short rate are small for this later period.
The regression results in Table 2 confirm the impressions given by
Table 1. We show, for the two sample periods, regressions of the short rate
on its own lagged value, including and excluding seasonal dummies. In the
earlier period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less
than one, again indicating that the short rate was mean—reverting. Also, the
seasonal dummies enter strongly significantly in the first period.12 In the
later period, the coefficient on the lagged short rate is close to one and the
seasonal dummy variables do not enter significantly, suggesting that the short
rate is close to a random walk. These results demonstrate that the process
for the short rate was very different after the founding of the Federal
Reserve and the abandonment of the Gold Standard.
III. The Short Rate Process and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
In this section we examine the implications of expectations-based
theories of the term structure for a traditional term structure equation,
such as that suggested by Modigliani and Sutch. As the Lucas critique
suggests, one should not expect such an equation to remain invariant when
there is a fundamental change in the stochastic process generating short—g-
rates. We show that the parameters of a reduced form equation estimated
over the two regimes considered in the previous section did -in fact change
in the way one would have predicted.
Theory
Let rt be the three—month yield and Rt be the six-month yield.
Consider a reduced-form equation relating the longer-term rate to the
short—rate:
(1) Rt =
wherea andare parameters and t is a random error. Equafion (1) is the
simplest version of the Modigliani-Sutch equation. This sort of equation,
often with additional lags, is used for policy analysis both in large—scale
models such as the MPS model (as noted by Olivier Blanchard, 1984) and in
smaller—scale simulation models (e.g., Richard Clarida and Benjamin
Friedman, 1984).
Expectations-based theories of the term structure relate the long—term
rate to current and expected future short-term rates. With monthly data,
(2) Rt =5(rt +Etrt+3)+
whereEt denotes the expectation conditional on information available at
time t and edenotesthe term premium. On the basis of the evidence
discussed above, let us suppose the short rate follows a first-order
autoregressive process.13That is, ignoring the constant and seasonal dummies
for simplicity,-10-
(3) rt+l =prt +
Equations (2) and (3) imply that
(4) Rt = (1 + p3) rt +
The standard expectations theory of the term structure, which is the
hypothesis that the term premium is constant, thus implies a restriction
across equations (1) and (3).In particular, it implies that
(5) = (1 + p3).
The more persistent are shocks to the short rate (higher p), the greater is
the response of the long rate to the short rate (higher ).
Ifthe term premium 8 is constant through time, as the expectations
theory assumes, then equation (4) has no error. More generally, however, if
the term premium varies but is uncorrelated with the short rate, then
equation (4) has an error but this error does not change the restriction in
equation (5). Since the restriction in equation (5) is much more general
than the expectations theory, the abundant evidence against the expectations
theory (e.g., Robert Shiller, John Campbell, and Kermit Schoenholtz, 1982;
Gregory Mankiw and Jeffrey Miron, 1985) is not directly relevant to this
restriction.
Once one interprets the error in the Modigliani-Sutch equation
as the term premium, however, there is no reason to suppose it is serially
uncorrelated. Below we quasi-difference equation (1) to correct for serial
correlation. As long as the term premium is uncorrelated with the short—11—
rate at leads and lags, the restriction in equation (5) continues to hold.
We can now see the implications of a change in the stochastic process
generating the short rate. Since the dynamic process of the short rate
(equation 3) changed from 1890-1910 to 1920—1933, there should have been a
change in the parameter of the Modigliani-Sutch relation (equation 1).In
particular, since shocks to the short rate became more persistent, the
long-term interest rate should have become more responsive to the short-term
interest rate.
Evidence
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of equation (1) for the two sample
periods considered in Section II.In Table 3 we use the level of long and
short rates, while in Table 4 we use quasi-differenced data in order to
account for serial correlation. The filter we use is (1 -0.5L), which is
suggested by the Durbin-Watson statistic of the regression in levels and
appears to leave the residual approximately serially uncorrelated. The
coefficient estimates we obtain with quasi—differenced data are not
qualitatively very different from those we obtain with the raw data. We
hereafter restrict our attention to the results with quasi-differenced data.
These results show clearly the effects of regime changes predicted by
Lucas. In particular, the relation between long rates and short rates
changed when the process for short rates changed in the way that the
expectations theory predicts. The coefficient in the Modigliani-Sutch
regression increased from 0.47 to 0.93 between the two periods.At least—12—
by the time period covered in our second sample, agents had come to
understand that a new, more persistent, process for the short rate was in
effect, and they had altered their behavior accordingly.14
The results, however, are not completely consistent with the simple
theory discussed above. While the sort of parameter drift observed is in
line with that predicted by theory, the point estimates of the coefficient
-in the Modigliani-Sutch equation are somewhat different than predicted. The
short rate equation in Table 2 predicts a coefficient of 0.73 for the
1890—1910 period and 0.97 for the 1920—1933 period, in contrast to the
actual estimates of 0.47 and 0.93. Thus, for the earlier period, the point
estimate -is quite different from what the theory predicts.
Table S presents joint estimates of the two equations imposing the
cross-equation restriction in equation (5). The estimate of the parameter in
the Modigliani-Sutch equation is 0.61 for the 1890—1910 period and 0.94 for
the 1920—1933 period. Not surprisingly, these estimates are between those
in Table 4 and those implied by Table 2. A formal likelihood ratio test of
the cross-equation restriction between the short rate equation and the
Modigliani—Sutch equation rejects that restriction for the 1890-1910 period
but not for the 1920—1933 period.'5
This statistical rejection of the cross-equation restriction appears
attributable to the assumption that the term premium is uncorrelated with
the short—term interest rate. To illustrate directly the covariation
between the term premium and the short rate, we can regress the excess
holding return on long bonds, (Rt —0.5(rt+rt+3)),on the short rate, rt,—13—
adjusting the standard errors for the moving average residual. The
coefficient on the short rate is -.11 with a t—statistic of 1.84 in the
1890-1910 period and -.01 with a t-statistic of 0.35 in the later period.
Hence, covariation between the term premium and the short rate appears to
account for the statistical rejection in the early period.16 While this
covariation invalidates the cross-equation restriction in equation (5), a
more persistent short rate (higher p) nonetheless leads, ceteris paribus, to
a more responsive long rate (higher ).Itis in this weaker sense that the
evidence is consistent with the theory presented above.
IV. The Timing of the Change in Regime
In this section we try to pin down the timing of the change in the
stochastic process for the three—month interest rate. We begin by
determining the most likely date for the change in regime, conditional on
the assumption that the change occurred all at once.We then consider the
possibility that the change in regime occurred gradually over time.
Step Switching
Suppose that the process for the short rate obeyed
rt+l =K0 + p0rt +vt.,t =
rt+l
=+ prt +v.t.,t =T51....,T
where T5 is the switch date (the first period of the new regime). Our goal
is to estimate T5. The procedure we use is the maximum likelihood
procedure suggested by Stephen Goldfeld and Richard Quandt (1976) and
recently applied by John Huizinga and Frederic Mishkin (1985) to the—14—
stochastic process followed by real interest rates. Assuming normal errors,
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We can determine the maximum likelihood value for T5 by computing the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters for all possible TS and
then choosing the value of T with the maximum likelihood.
Table 6 shows the log likelihood of various possible switch dates
around the maximum likelihood switch date.17 According to these results, the
most likely date of the new regime is December 1914 when month dummies are
excluded but February 1915 when month dummies are included. Remember that
the Federal Reserve System opened for operation on November 16, 1914. This
econometric estimate of the date of the new regime is thus very close to
the date an historical account would suggest.
To judge the degree of confidence one should have in these point
estimates of the date the new regime began, we calculate the posterior odds
ratio for alternative switch dates. If one has diffuse priors (that is,
one considers all possible switch dates equally likely), then the ratio of
the likelihood values for different switch dates produces the posterior
odds ratio. The posterior odds ratio is the ratio of subjective—15—
probabilities of different switch dates conditioning on the data.18
Table 6 shows, for a range of possible switch dates, the posterior
odds ratio of that date as a switch date compared to the maximum likelihood
date. The months from December 1914 to March 1915 are all highly probable
as the date of the regime change. The relative odds for the dates before
December 1914 or after May 1915, however, are extremely low. Hence,
although we cannot be certain of the exact date of the sw-itch, we can
conclude with a high degree of confidence that the date for the switch was
within a few months after the beginning of the Federal Reserve System.
Since the posterior odds ratio for any potential switch date before
December 1914 is very low, the change in the stochastic process for short
rates is more likely attributable to the founding of the Fed than to the
abandonment of the Gold Standard.19 The Gold Standard was suspended at the
outbreak of World War I in August 1914. The results in Table 6 indicate
that the months between the beginning of the War and the introduction of the
Fed are more consistent with the old regime than with the new regime. A
casual examination of the data easily explains this result. Between
November 1914 and December 1914, the short term interest rate fell from 6
percent to 4 1/8 percent. If the new (random walk) regime had already
been in effect, such an event would have been very unusual: it would have
required approximately a four standard deviation shock. Under the old
(mean—reverting) regime, such an event was much less atypical: it required
approximately a one standard deviation shock.Hence, these data imply that
it is very unlikely that the new regime began before December 1914.20—16—
Logistic Switching
Our second procedure for determining the timing of the change in the
process for short rates is to estimate a time-varying parameter model that
allows the coefficients of the short rate equation to change gradually over
time, rather than moving instantaneously from the old to the new values as
in the switching regression above. Specifically, we assume that the
parameters of the short rate equation follow a logistic curve. That is,
the short rate process is
r÷1 = + pt'.'t+







L(t) = a+ôt 1+e
All the parameters of the short rate process adjust continuously together.
The parameters a and a determine when the regime change occurs. In
particular, at t =-a/ô,L(t) =1/2and the logistic curve has its
inflection. At this date, the short rate process is an equal mix of the
old and the new regimes.—17—
The parameter 5 determines the rate at which the parameterschange
from their old values to their new values. Since L(t) reachesone only
asymptotically, the parameters approach their new values asymptotically.




Then t(3/4) -t(1/4)is the period of time it takes for the parameters to
make one half of the adjustment (from one-fourth new regime to
three—fourths new regime). Straightforward algebra shows that
t(3/4) -t(1/4)=log(9)/o
Hence, the parameter S is inversely related to the rate of adjustment
between regimes. The limit of the logistic curve (6 —oo) isthe step
function, so this time—varying parameter model includes our earlier model
as an extreme case.
Table 7 presents results for the logistic time-varying parameter
specification of the short rate process. The parameters are estimated with
maximum likelihood assuming normal errors; see Goldfeld and Quandt.
We estimate the short rate process both excluding and including month
dummies. To reduce the computational problem, when month dummiesare
included, their coefficients are set equal to the values estimated for the
old and new regimes as presented in Table 2.
Since the rate of adjustment is the key parameter here, we present
the results for various rates of adjustment, choosing theremaining-18-
parameters to maximize the likelihood function. For each rate of
adjustment, we present the maximum likelihood switch date (L(T5) = 1/2), the
maximum likelihood value achievable with that rate of adjustment, and the
posterior odds ratio for that rate of adjustment relative to the maximum
likelihood rate of adjustment.
The results in Table 7 indicate that either the step function (8 = co)
or a very steep logistic curve has the highest likelihood value.Since the
implied switch dates for these curves are in the first few months of 1915,
these steep logistic curves closely approximate the step function considered
above. The likelihoods of less steep logistic curves, however, are much
lower. We can conclude with a high degree of confidence that most of the
change in regime occurred in less than one year.
V. Learning About the Change in Regime
In Section III we demonstrated that, at least after a period of several
years, agents had correctly responded to the new stochastic process forthe
short rate. Here we estimate how quickly this response occurred. As in our
treatment of the short rate process, we examine both step switching and
logistic switching.
The relationship between long rates and short rates depends on agents1
perception of their environment. Suppose, for example, that even after the
stochastic process for the short rate had changed to the more persistent
process, agents had believed that the old mean-reverting process for the
short rate was still in effect. (Such a situation might arise if agents had-19-
applied standard regression techniques to recent data to estimate the short
rate process.) In this case, fluctuations in the short rate would have been
perceived as more transitory than they truly were. The long rate, which
depends on the expected short rate, would have responded to the short rate
as under the old regime. In other words, if perceptions adjusted gradually
to the new regime, then the change in the empirical relationship between
long and short rates should lag the change in the short rate process.
Step Switching
Table 8 presents the log likelihood of the Modigliani-Sutch equation
for a range of possible switch dates around the maximum likelihood date.21
The maximum likelihood switch date is December 1914 when month dummies are
excluded and October 1914 when month dummies are included. The posterior
odds ratio of all dates from October 1914 to January 1915 are fairly high.
We can state with a high degree of confidence that the Modigliani-Sutch
equation changed within a few months of the date the process for the short
rate changed, even though we cannot be confident about the exact date. The
data strongly support the conclusion that agents quickly understood that
the introduction of the Fed had changed the stochastic environment in which
they were operating.
LoQistic Switching
We present estimates of the logistic model for the Modigliani-Sutch
equation in Table g22 Both excluding and including month dummies, the
maximum likelihood estimate of the time it took for the parameters to move-20-
half-way is one month, and the implied switch date is November 1914. The
posterior odds ratios presented in the Table show that adjustment periods of
several months are reasonably likely, but that an adjustment period of six
months or longer is highly improbable.
This result, that the participants in financial markets reacted quickly
and properly to the change in the stochastic process of the short rate within
a few months, is striking. It is clear that agents could not have estimated
the new process for the short rate in just a few months. Our results
suggest, nonetheless, that they had a good understanding of exactly what the
new regime would be like. This finding is particularly dramatic, because
the new regime was not the sort of event for which there were many past
observations from which to draw infererences.
Indeed, the data are consistent with an even stronger conclusion. We
can see from the results that the Modigliani-Sutch equation may have changed
before the process for the short rate changed. This finding suggests that
agents anticipated the effects of the introduction of the Fed and modified
their behavior accordingly, even before the Fed actually existed. If agents
knew in October that the process for short rates would change in December,
then the long rate implied by the expectations theory should have
incorporated this fact. As we discuss in Section I, the Act establishing the
Fed was passed in 1913, and the announcement of the opening of the Fed
occurred in July 1914. Thus, as a matter of history, agents did know when
the Fed would begin operations. It is not implausible that agents also
understood in advance the impact the Fed would have on the pattern of
interest rates.—21—
VI. Conclusion
The picture that emerges from this study is that of a remarkably fast
adjustment of expectations and behavior in the face of a major change in the
economic policy regime. We of course cannot determine exactly the timing and
rate of adjustment to the new regime. Nonetheless, it would be difficult
to reconcile these data with the hypothesis that agents observed the new
regime for many months before responding to it.
Several caveats are in order. First, by looking only at term structure
data, we are able to examine only the expectations of a relatively small
group: New York financiers and businessmen who participated in the time loan
market. Indeed, it may not even be necessary that all members of thisgroup
held the correct expectation right away; arbitrage by a well—informed subset
might have produced the results we find. One should be cautious in applying
our findings to situations in which the relevant expectations are those of a
larger or less sophisticated group of economic actors.
Second, the implications of the regime change that we study, at least
for short-term credit markets, were not difficult to predict. Since
interest rate stability was one of the announced targets of Fed policy, no
one should have been surprised that the stochastic process of short rates
did in fact change. In many other cases of regime changes, the crucial
expectations are those of non-target variables. In these cases, the
relevant economic actors must have an implicit or explicit model of the
economy, which complicates their problem of understanding the new regime.
Finally, we note that observers in 1914 could have had a high degree of-22-
confidence that the Federal Reserve System would function as had been
announced in advance. There was only modest political opposition to the new
institution and no apparent benefits to the Fed in not fulfilling the
expectations it had created. Our study does not speak directly to the
problem of achieving credibility for an optimal but time—inconsistent
policy.
The primary implication of all these caveats is that many particular
circumstances facilitated the rapid adjustment of expectations to the regime
change studied here. We therefore cannot be certain whether this phenomenon
is to be found more generally. But the creation of the Federal Reserve does
illustrate the surprising speed with which financial market participants can
at times respond to a major change in the economic policy regime.—23—
Data Appendix
The data used in this paper are the time loan rates available at New York
banks during the first week of the month from 1890 to 1933.In 1910, the
National Monetary Comission compiled these data from 1890 to 1909 by
tabulating them from the Financial Review. We updated these series using the
Review and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, which took over from the
Review in 1921. The rates are reported as a range, which is typically 12.5
to 25 basis points in size. We use the midpoint of the range. Tables Al and
A2 report all the data used.-24-
Table 1: Autocorrelations of the Short Rate
Standard
Deviation 1.54 1.08 1.94 0.51
Note: The approximate standard errors for the autocorrelations are 0.06 for
the 1890—1910 sample and 0.08 for the 1921-1933 sample.
1891—1910 1921—1933
Level Change Level Change
First 0.75 -0.18 0.95 0.03
Second 0.60 0.12 0.89 0.03
Third 0.39 -0.21 0.84 -0.10
Fourth 0.28 —0.04 0.79 0.09
Fifth 0.19 —0.05 0.74 0.12
Sixth 0.12 -0.09 0.67 0.05
Seventh 0.10 -0.01 0.60 -0.03
Eighth 0.09 -0.09 0.54 0.02
Ninth 0.11 0.01 0.48 -0.09
Tenth 0.13 0.00 0.44 0.00
Eleventh 0.14 0.08 0.38 -0.01
Twelfth 0.13 0.13 0.33 0.05—25—
Table2: Regression of Short Rate on Lagged Short Rate
Dependent Variable: rt+i

















































































Standard errors are in parentheses.
—26—


































































Table 4: Regression of Long Rate on Short Rate: Quasi-differenced
Dependent Variable: (10.5 L)Rt
1890-1910 (1=251) 1920—1933 (1=168)
constant 1.25 1.24 0.19 0.18
(0.06) (0.12) (0.03) (0.05)
(1 —0.5L)rt 0.48 0.47 0.94 0.93
























R 0.58 0.58 0.98 0.98
s.e.e. 0.44 0.44 0.15 0.15
D.W. 2.10 2.09 2.20 2.22
Standard errors are in parentheses.—28—





























































































































0.60 0.54 0.94 0.98
0.99 0.49 0.51 0.16




Table 6: Switch Date for ShortRate Equation
rt+1 =K + prt
Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function. The posterior odds
ratio is the probability that the switch occured at that date relative to
the probability that the switch occured at the date with the highest







1914:1 613.2 .000 576.3 .000
2 611.3 .000 573.8 .000
3 611.8 .000 574.1 .000
4 612.2 .000 574.6 .000
5 612.7 .000 574.9 .000
6 612.9 .000 575.2 .000
7 613.0 .000 575.2 .000
8 583.1 .005 546.2 .004
9 582.3 .011 545.0 .013
10 582.7 .007
• 545.1 .012
11 583.0 .006 545.6 .007
12 577.8 1.000 540.9 .803
1915:1 578.1 .741 540.9 .741
2 578.0 .819 540.6 1.000
3 578.8 .368 541.1 .631
4 579.5 .183 541.8 .304
5 580.2 .091 542.5 .160
6 581.0 .041 543.1 .084
7 581.7 .020 543.7 .045
8 582.3 .011 544.5 .021
9 583.0 .006 545.4 .009
10 583.7 .003 546.3 .004
11 584.4 .001 547.3 .001
12 585.1 .001 548.0 .001-30-
Table 7: Logistic Switching for the Short Rate Equation
rt+l =K + prt
Excluding Month Dummies
Months for 1/2 of Switch (6) Switch Date—log L Posterior- Odds Ratio
0.0 () 1914:12 577.8 1.000
1.0 (2.197) 1915:01 578.2 .670
2.0 (1.099) 1915:02 577.9 .905
3.0 (0.732) 1915:01 578.1 .741
6.0 (0.366) 1915:04 579.2 .247
12.0 (0.183) 1915:08 582.0 .015
24.0 (0.092) 1916:07 584.7 .001
36.0 (0.061) 1916:10 585.4 .001
48.0 (0.046) 1916:12 586.6 .000
60.0 (0.037) 1917:03 587.8 .000
Including Month Dummies
Months for 1/2 of Switch (6) Switch Date-log L Posterior Odds Ratio
0.0 (cx) 1915:02 542.8 .670
1.0 (2.197) 1915:02 542.4 1.000
2.0 (1.099) 1915:02 542.4 .990
3.0 (0.732) 1915:02 542.5 .896
6.0 (0.366) 1915:04 543.9 .230
12.0 (0.183) 1915:07 547.6 .006
24.0 (0.092) 1916:10 549.6 .001
36.0 (0.061) 1916:10 551.1 .000
48.0 (0.046) 1916:11 553.1 .000
60.0 (0.037) 1917:02 554.7 .000
Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function for the set of parameter-s
that maximizes the likelihood for the value of 6. The posterior odds ratio
is the probability that that value of (5 relative to the probability that the
value of o with the highest likelihood; this calculation is based on the



























































































































Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function. The posterior odds
ratio is the probability that the switch occured at that date relative to
the probability that the switch occured at the date with the highest
likelihood; this calculation is based on the estimated likelihood value and
diffuse priors.






Table 9: Logistic Switching for the Modigliani-Sutch Equation
(1 —0.5L) Rt =a+(1-0.5L) rt
Excluding Month Dummies
Months for 1/2 of Switch (6) Switch Date-log L Posterior Odds Ratio
0.0 (cx)) 1914:12 83.2 .741
1.0 (2.197) 1914:11 82.9 1.000
2.0 (1.099) 1914:12 83.8 .407
3.0 (0.732) 1915:01 84.3 .247
6.0 (0.366) 1915:03 85.8 .055
12.0 (0.183) 1915:05 89.9 .001
24.0 (0.092) 1915:08 96.7 .000
36.0 (0.061) 1916:11 95.2 .000
48.0 (0.046) 1916:10 96.5 .000
60.0 (0.037) 1916:12 98.5 .000
rncluding Month Dummies
Months for 1/2 of Switch (6) Switch Date-log L Posterior Odds Ratio
0.0 (x)) 1914:11 65.9 .538
1.0 (2.197) 1914:11 65.3 1.000
2.0 (1.099) 1914:12 66.3 .353
3.0 (0.732) 1915:01 66.9 .200
6.0 (0.366) 1915:03 68.7 .034
12.0 (0.183) 1915:05 73.8 .000
24.0 (0.092) 1915:07 83.2 .000
36.0 (0.061) 1917:01 84.1 .000
48.0 (0.046) 1917:01. 85.2 .000
60.0 (0.037) 1916:11 87.3 .000
Note: log L is the log of the likelihood function for the set of parameters
that maximizes the likelihood for the value of 6.The posterior odds ratio
is the probability that that value of c5relativeto the probability that the
value of 5withthe highest likelihood; this calculation is based on the
estimated likelihood value and diffuse priors.-33-
Table Al: Three Month Interest Rate





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A2: Six Month Interest Rate
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1. The year 1914 also saw the outbreak of World War I. Our estimates of
the stochastic process followed by the short-term interest rate indicate
that the short rate followed essentially the same process in the 1915-1918
period as in the 1919-1933 period. It appears, therefore, that the war was
not itself the major factor -in the regime change examined here. Truman
Clark (1986) has recently called into question whether the change in the
behavior of interest rates at this time was due to the founding of the
Federal Reserve, noting that a similar change took place in other countries
as well. Clark provides no alternative explanation, however. While our
econometric results below point to the founding of the Fed rather than the
abandonment of the Gold Standard as the likely cause of the regime change,
our analysis of the adjustment of expectations does not rely on the Fed
being the source of the change.
2.The classical Gold Standard effectively came to an end at the outbreak
of World War I at the beginning of August 1914. During the period
1919—1931, most countries expected to return to a fully operational Gold-36-
Standard and several resumed specie payments for limited periods. Overall,
however, the period was not very similar to the classical Gold Standard era.
3.Literary Digest, November 27, 1915, quoting Warburg at the time of the
founding.
4. New York Times, November 16, 1914, page 8.
5. Ibid, page 1.
6.The Wall Street Journal wrote, "The periodical convulsions in the money
market for some time past had indicated clearly that there was something
wrong with the currency medium of exchange of the country which was shown to
be the lack of elasticity of circulation." (November 16, 1914, page 1) The
New York Times wrote, "When the new regime is fully operative, the currency
volume will rise and fall with bank deposits, which will rise and fall with
the course of trade." (November 16, 1914, page 8)
7. "Washington Notes: The First Year of the Federal Reserve System,"
Journal of Political Economy 23 (1915), page 994. No author is listed.
8.New York Times, November 17, 1915, page 10.
9. Our focus here on the nominal short rate and the term structure of
nominal interest rates is not meant to imply that real interest rates are
unimportant. The expectations theory implies a change in the relation
betheen long and short nominal rates even if, as Robert Shiller (1980)
suggests, the stochastic process for real rates did not change.-37-
10. This data set is described in the Data Appendix and is examined in Mankiw
and Miron (1986a).
11. We end the second sample in 1933 because in that year the Glass—Steagall
act introduced a variety of banking regulations. The results would be
essentially the same if we ended the second period before the beginning of
the Great Depression in 1929.
12. The seasonal fluctuations in interest rates, which are not of primary
importance for the issues we address in this paper, are discussed in
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963, pp. 292-296), Shiller (1980), Miron
(1986), Clark (1986), and Mankiw and Miron (1986b).
13. The assumption implicit here is that individuals have no information in
forecasting the short rate other than the variables included in this
equation. This assumption is obviously a strong one and can only be
justified as an approximation. One test is to include the long rate in the
forecasting equation, since the long rate would reflect any additional
information on the future short rate. For the 1890-1910 period, the long
rate coefficient is statistically significant but the improvement in fit is
very small: the standard error of estimate falls by only .027 (2.7 basis
points) .Forthe 1920—1933 period, the long rate coefficient is not
statistically significant. Hence, the assumption that agents have little
information additional to that in our posited forecasting equation appears
empirically plausible.-38-
14. Stanley Fischer (1983) writes, "It is indeed remarkable that the Lucas
policy evaluation critique has triumphed without any detailed empirical
support beyond Lucas's assertion that macroeconometric models in the 1960s
all predicted too little inflation in the 1970s. The general point made by
the cr-itique is correct and was known before it was so eloquently and
forcefully propounded by Lucas. That the point has been empirically
relevant, however, is something that should have been demonstrated rather
than asserted." The evidence from the founding of the Fed provides such a
demonstration.
15. Under the assumption that the error in the Mod-igliani-Sutch equation is
the term premium and independent of the error in the short rate equation, the
joint log likelihood is the sum of the two individual log likelihoods. We
maximize the joint log likelihood by numerical optimization. We do not impose
here cross—equation restrictions on the month dummies, which allows for the
possibility of a seasonal term premium.
16. Measurement error in the short rate is observationally equivalent to a
negative covariation between the term premium and the short rate. While
there is clearly some measurement error in these data, since the interest
rates are the midpoint of a reported range of typically 12.5-25 basis
points, we suspect that the measurement error is not sufficiently great to
explain the results reported in the text.
17. We have searched over all possible switch dates 1890-1933, but only
report values around the global maximum. Since the coefficient estimates
are essentially the same as those in Table 2, we do not report them here.—39—
18. We view this posterior odds ratio as a simple metric for judging how
flat or steep is the likelihood function. Note that for each switch date,
the remaining parameters are chosen to maximize the likelihood. An
alternative caTculation (see, e.g., Donald Holbert, 1982) would be to posit
a prior joint distribution over all the parameters, to use the likelihood
function to yield a posterior joint distribution over all the parameters,
and then to integrate out the remaining parameters to produce the posterior
marginal distribution for the switch date. In our application, since the
most likely values of the remaining parameters vary very little over
plausible switch dates, we believe this latter calculation would produce
similar conclusions.
19. We do not intend to suggest that the abandonment of the Gold Standard
was completely irrelevant. If the Gold Standard had continued in effect,
the Fed may have been less able to affect nominal interest rates.
20. If the single observation of the November-December drop in the short
rate is excluded, we are unable to distinguish between the abandonment of
the Gold Standard and the founding of the Fed as the cause of the regime
change.
21. The coefficient estimates are essentially the same as those in Table 4.
22. We again reduce the computational problem by using the estimates in
Table 4 for the month dummies.—40—
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